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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ABANDONMENT AS GROUNDS FOR THE FORFEITU1RE OF A RIGHT OF
ELECTION AGAINST A WILL
In the general revision of the Decedent Estate Law, effective
September 1, 1930, a surviving spouse was given the right of election
to take against the will of the deceased spouse, subject, however, to
certain stated limitations.1 Section 18 granting this new right con-
fers the privilege upon the maker of a will to provide certain forms
of benefit for the surviving spouse. Minimum requirements are fixed.
If these benefits are given, the surviving spouse cannot exercise the
right of election to take against the will and its terms stand. If the
testator gives less than the statutory requirements, the surviving
spouse may elect to take certain benefits defined in the section. In
some cases the surviving spouse may take the difference between
I Matter of Sadowski, 246 App. Div. 490, 284 N. Y. Supp. 490 (4th Dep't
1935).
N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 18, subd. 1 provides:
"(a) In exercising the right of election herein granted a surviving spouse
shall in no event be entitled to take more than one-half of the net estate of the
decedent, after the deduction of debts, funeral and administration expenses and
any estate tax, and the words 'intestate share' wherever used in this section shall
in no event be construed to mean more than one-half of such net estate.
"(b) Where the intestate share is over twenty-five hundred dollars and
where the testator has devised or bequeathed in trust an amount equal to or
greater than the intestate share, with income thereof payable to the surviving
spouse for life, the surviving spouse shall have the limited right to elect to take
the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars absolutely which shall be deducted
from the principal of such trust fund and the terms of the will shall otherwise
remain effective.
"(c) Where the intestate share of the surviving spouse in the estate does
not exceed twenty-five hundred dollars, the surviving spouse shall have such
right to elect to take his or her intestate share absolutely, which shall be in lieu
of any provision for his or her benefit in the will.
"(d) Where the will contains an absolute legacy or devise, whether general
or specific, to the surviving spouse, of or in excess of the sum of twenty-five
hundred dollars and also a provision for a trust for his or her benefit for life
of a principal equal to or more than the excess between said legacy or devise
and his or her intestate share, no right of election whatever shall exist in the
surviving spouse.
"(e) Where the will contains an absolute legacy or devise, whether
general or specific, to the surviving spouse in an amount less than the sum of
twenty-five hundred dollars and also a provision for a trust for his or her
benefit for life of a principal equal to or more than the excess between said
legacy or devise and his or her intestate share, the surviving spouse shall have
the limited right to elect to take not more than the sum of twenty-five hundred
dollars inclusive of the amount of such legacy or devise, and the difference
between such legacy or devise and the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars shall
be deducted from the principal of such trust fund and the terms of the will
shall otherwise remain effective.
"(f) Where the aggregate of the provisions under the will for the benefit
of the surviving spouse including the principal of a trust, or a legacy or devise,
or any other form of testamentary provision, is less than the intestate share,
the surviving spouse shall have the limited right to elect to take the difference
between such aggregate and the amount of the intestate share, and the terms of
the will shall otherwise remain effective."
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what has been given and the share which the section prescribes.
Where the will fails to comply with the statutory plan, or where there
is a complete disinheritance, the surviving spouse may take all the
statutory benefits outright2
This statutory right of election is denied to a surviving spouse
against whom or in whose favor a final decree or judgment of divorce
recognized as valid by the law of this state has been rendered, or
against whom a final decree or judgment of separation recognized as
valid by the laws of this state has been rendered. It is also denied
to a spouse who has procured without this state a final decree or judg-
ment dissolving the marriage with the testator where such a decree or
judgment is not recognized as valid by the law of this state.3 A de-
cree of separation does not dissolve the marriage relation. Conse-
quently, where the separation is procured by the surviving spouse, he
or she is not deprived of the right of election. The spouse against
whom the judgment is obtained is the only one deprived of that right.4
It is to be noted that the statute does not bar a right of election to a
spouse who has been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment or whose
conduct made it unsafe and improper for the deceased spouse to co-
habit with the survivor.5 The adulterous spouse is not barred in the
absence of a decree of divorce based upon infidelity.6
The statutory provisions barring a right of election to a husband
who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife, or abandoned
her; 7 or to a wife who has abandoned her husbands have been sub-
ject to considerable judicial interpretation.
To bar a spouse from taking an elective share upon the ground
of abandonment, or a husband for neglect or refusal to provide for
his wife, the proof must be such as would sustain a judgment of sep-
aration under § 1161 of the Civil Practice Act.9 Abandonment as
2 Matter of Byrnes, 260 N. Y. 465, 184 N. E. 56 (1932), rearg. denied, 261
N. Y. 623, 185 N. E. 765 (1933).3 N. Y. DFc. Es". LAW § 18, subd. 5; Matter of Dress, 279 N. Y. 703,
18 N. E. (2d) 322 (1938) ; Matter of Fingerlin, 167 Misc. 880, 4 N. Y. S. (2d)
668 (1938); Matter of Browning, 153 Misc. 564, 276 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1934).
4 Matter of Smith, 243 App. Div. 348, 276 N. Y. Supp. 648 (4th Dep't
1935).
1 Matter of Green, 155 Misc. 641, 280 N. Y. Supp. 692, aff'd, 246 App.
Div. 588, 284 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1935).
6 Matter of Green, 155 Misc. 641, 280 N. Y. Supp. 692, aff'd, 246 App. Div.
588, 284 N. Y. Supp. 370 (lst Dep't 1935).
7 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 18, subd. 3.
8 N. Y. Dac. Est. LAW § 18, subd. 4; Matter of Dress, 279 N. Y. 703,
18 N. E. (2d) 322 (1938).
Matter of Maiden, 284 N. Y. 429, 31 N. E. (2d) 889 (1940); Matter of
Quick, 262 App. Div. 808, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (4th Dep't 1941); Matter of
Kellas, 256 App. Div. 425, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 879 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281
N. Y. 813, 24 N. E. (2d) 485 (1939) ; Matter of Sadowski, 246 App. Div. 490,
284 N. Y. Supp. 490 (4th Dep't 1935); Matter of Green, 155 Misc. 830, 280
N. Y. Supp. 692, aff'd, 246 App. Div. 588, 284 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't
1935); Matter of Wheeler, 156 Misc. 830, 282 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1935); Matter
of Stolz, 145 Misc. 799, 260 N. Y. Supp. 906 (1932).
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used in the law of divorce contemplates a voluntary separation of
one party from the other without justification, with the intention of
not returning.' 0 Where the wife consents to the separation there is
no abandonment. It is only where the husband deserts the wife with-
out her consent and refuses to give her adequate and proper support,
that an action for abandonment will lie."
Matter of Maiden,'2 recently considered by the Court of Appeals
and decided by a divided court, involved a widow's right to elect. It
appeared from the deposition of the widow that she left her husband's
home on November 1, 1928 after having had a conversation with him
the evening before. She had previously on the morning of that day
sent away two trunks filled with her belongings. In another part of
the deposition she stated that the reason for her departure was his
continued insistence in her participating with him in acts of sexual
perversion; that this conduct continued throughout the period that
they lived together, that is, from the date of their marriage on July
27, 1927, to the time of her departure, and that his conduct probably
wore upon her health to such an extent that she consulted a physi-
cian and shortly thereafter separated from him. Though her husband
died more than eight years after she had left him, she never, in the
interval, saw the decedent or communicated in any way with him.
She brought no action against him and made no claim against him
during his life for support. The surrogate found no abandonment on
the part of the husband and determined that the widow was entitled
to no part of the decedent's estate. In reversing his decree, the Ap-
pellate Division held that the representative had failed to sustain the
burden of establishing that the widow had abandoned the deceased
spouse and that, if her testimony was rejected, the case was devoid
of any proof as to what caused the separation. In reviewing this de-
termination the Court of Appeals appears to have been unanimous in
holding that the legislature intended to exclude a wife from an elective
share only where the abandonment would be cause for an action of
separation as provided in § 1161 of the Civil Practice Act. There
was, however, a sharp division as to the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence. The majority view in defining the nature of abandonment
said "To constitute abandonment under this statute something more
is necessary than a departure from the marital abode or a living
apart. * * * To amount to abandonment the departure of a spouse
from the marital home must be unjustified and without the consent
of the other spouse. The reason is inseparable from the act." 13 In
confirming the right of election the majority of the court, observing
10 Williams v. Williams, 130 N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98 (1891); Matter of
Kellas, 256 App. Div. 425, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 879 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281
N. Y. 813, 24 N. E. (2d) 485 (1939).
"Matter of Powers, 33 App. Div. 126, 53 N. Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dep't
1898).
12284 N. Y. 429, 31 N. E. (2d) 889 (1940).
13 Matter of Maiden, 284 N. Y. 429, 432, 31 N. E. (2d) 889, 890 (1940).
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that separations occur in so many instances with fault and without
fault, with consent and without consent, were unwilling to rest a
conclusion of fault on the part of the departing spouse on inference
alone. It took the view that whether the testimony of the widow as
to the reason she left her husband was accepted or rejected, the legal
representative had failed to sustain the burden of proof. If her tes-
timony was true, she was justified in leaving. If false, there was mere
departure without proof that it was unjustified and without the con-
sent of the spouse. In the absence of such proof, the reason for leav-
ing would rest upon inference alone. In the light of this holding it
would seem to follow that even though the trier of the facts may re-
ject the reason given by the surviving spouse for her departure as un-
true, the legal representative, upon whom rests the burden of estab-
lishing abandonment, can only defeat her right to take a share in the
deceased spouse's estate by affirmative proof that the husband was
without fault and gave no consent. In the absence of such proof, the
result would be the same in a case where the surviving spouse re-
mained silent and offered no explanation for her departure.
Civil Practice Act § 1161 prescribed no period of absence as a
prerequisite to an action for abandonment. If the wife's absence is
a temporary one which has not ripened into an abandonment at the
time she offers to return, it is the husband's duty to take her back.
The offer or consent to return after departure with the intention of
not returning, to be effective, must, therefore, be made in good faith
within a reasonable time after departure or at least after the hus-
band's offer to receive the wife. What is reasonable will depend on
the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties. Her
conduct amounts to abandonment only after it is persistent and
obstinate.' 4
Abandonment, resulting in a denial of the right to elect, is estab-
lished where the proof discloses that the husband, without any sep-
aration agreement, left his wife and failed to support and live with
her for fifteen years preceding her death during which time she
wholly supported herself.' 5 Where a wife claims that her husband
disappeared and abandoned her, she will be denied a share in his
estate upon the ground of abandonment where, after living with her
husband for one year after the marriage, she left him and moved to
the home of her parents and, after residing there about a year, moved
to an adjoining state in which ten years later she instituted an action
for divorce against her husband which she abandoned and thereupon
entered into a ceremonial marriage with another by whom she had a
child still living, and with whom she continuously lived for more than
thirty-five years, and the proof shows that she might have easily
ascertained the whereabouts of the decedent who worked for the same
2 4 Bohmert v. Bohmert, 241 N. Y. 446, 150 N. E. 511 (1926).
Is Matter of Barnes, 149 Misc. 149, 267 N. Y. Supp. 634 (1933).
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employer for a long time and lived for over twenty-five years in the
matrimonial domicile.16
Abandonment by a husband is not made out where it appears
that he left involuntarily and at the express request of his wife who
owned the home, was herself possessed of ample means, rejected his
efforts for a reconciliation and during the ten-year period of separa-
tion preceding her death refrained from compelling him to support
her.17
Where a wife, upon learning that her husband is suffering from
a loathsome disease, refuses to cohabit with and leaves him, her de-
parture will be regarded as justified and not a bar to the assertion
of her right of election.' 8
There is no abandonment where the spouses have lived apart by
agreement and the husband has made the agreed payments, 19 or where,
in lieu of periodic payments for the wife's support, the husband made
a conveyance which constituted a valuable consideration 20 or a lump
sum payment of all obligations for support.2 1 Where there has been
a reconciliation between the husband and wife and the latter volun-
tarily resumed living with her husband, a prior abandonment on his
part is wiped out and the husband is entitled to his elective share.22
Where the spouses are living together and the wife supports the hus-
band and in addition gave him large sums of money, his failure to
support her will not be regarded as "neglect or refusal to support"
upon the theory that the wife never expected or demanded it.23
Where the only testimony offered in opposition is the claim of
the husband, who had not been living with the deceased spouse for
a considerable time, consisted of statements made by the deceased to
the witnesses to the effect that he had failed to support her, together
with a statement of similar import included in the will, it was held
to be insufficient to establish either abandonment or failure to pro-
vide.24 Proof of judgments of the Domestic Relations Court and the
Magistrates' Court that the husband was a disorderly person is
16 Matter of Fingerlin, 167 Misc. 770, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 668 (1938).
1 7 Matter of Sadowski, 246 App. Div. 490, 284 N. Y. Supp. 490 (4th
Dep't 1935).
8 sMatter of Wheeler, 156 Misc. 830, 282 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1936).
29 Matter of Stolz, 145 Misc. 799, 260 N. Y. Supp. 906 (1932).20 Matter of McCann, 155 Misc. 763, 281 N. Y. Supp. 445 (1935) ; Matter
of Brown, 153 Misc. 282, 274 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1934).
21 Thompson v. Thompson, 163 Misc. 946, 299 N. Y. Supp. 55 (1937), aff'd,
254 App. Div. 601, 2 N. Y. S (2d) 858 (3d Dep't 1938); Matter of Tankelo-
witz, 162 Misc. 474, 295 N. Y. Supp. 754 (1937) ; Matter of Sachs, 155 Misc.
233, 279 N. Y. Supp. 404, af'd, 246 App. Div. 546, 282 N. Y. Supp. 693 (2d
Dep't 1935).
22 Matter of Sidman, 153 Misc. 735, 276 N. Y. Supp. 56 (1934).2 3 Matter of Armond, 174 Misc. 486, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 18 (1940) ; City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 297 N. Y. Supp. 88, ajff'd,
253 App. Div. 707, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 640 (1st Dep't 1937).
24 Matter of Chamberlain, 161 Misc. 880, 293 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1937).
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prima facie evidence of his refusal or neglect to provide for his wife. 25
It is now well established that the burden of proving abandon-
ment rests upon the party alleging it.26
The legislative policy of barring a spouse from an elective share
where there was an abandonment or a neglect or refusal to provide
was not incorporated in the general revision of the Decedent Estate
Law in regard to a share passing to the surviving spouse by intes-
tacy.27 By subsequent amendment a surviving spouse is barred upon
similar grounds from receiving an intestate share.28  This policy has
been further extended to dowager for wrongful death 29 and to the
statutory cash and property exemptions granted a husband and wife
under the provisions of the Surrogate's Court Act.30
JAMES J. THORNTON.
MALPRACTICE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I
Ironical as it seems, the New York State Legislature in its
efforts clearly to define the rights and remedies of citizens of the
state has at times enacted statutes which, in their ambiguity, con-
found bench and bar alike. Courts, reluctant to go beyond a literal
interpretation of these statutes, have often placed upon them harsh
and unfair constructions which remain long unchallenged because of
a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. The inevitable re-
sult is an unending list of unjust decisions. This has been the case
25 Matter of Rechtschaffen, 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357 (1938).
26 Matter of Maiden, 284 N. Y. 429, 31 N. E. (2d) 889 (1940); Matter
of Rechtschaffen, 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357 (1938) ; Matter of Quick,
262 App. Div. 808, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (4th Dep't 1941).
27 Matter of Knuppel, 151 Misc. 773, 273 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1933).
2 8 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 87, subd. c and d providing:
"No distributive share of the estate of a decedent shall be allowed under
the provisions of this article, either
(c) to a husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or has abandoned her;
(d) or to a wife who has abandoned her husband."2 9 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 133, subd. 4a and b providing:
"No distributive share of such damages shall be allowed under the pro-
visions of this article either
(a) To a husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or has abandoned her;
(b) Or to a wife who has abandoned her husband."
30 N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 200, subd. 6, providing: "No property or money
shall be set apart under this section to a surviving spouse who cannot inherit
as a distributee, any part of the estate of a deceased spouse who died intestate;
nor to a surviving spouse who can neither inherit, nor claim any rights against
the estate of a deceased spouse who has died testate."
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